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 The Economic Theory of Sharecropping
 in Early Modern France
 PHILIP T. HOFFMAN
 This paper uses a simple economic model of contract choice to explain the growth
 of sharecropping in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France-a topic that
 figures in much of the social and economic history of the period. The theory turns
 out to fit both qualitative and quantitative evidence, and although the results are
 as yet only preliminary, the theory does provide a better account of the spread of
 sharecropping than the explanations upon which early modern historians have
 tended to rely.
 BETWEEN the close of the Middle Ages and roughly 1700 the
 French countryside witnessed a dramatic expansion of sharecrop-
 ping. Little known in most regions of France in medieval times,
 agricultural sharecropping, to quote Marc Bloch, "showed a sudden
 increase" in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, just as it had
 earlier in northern Italy. For Bloch and historians ever since, the spread
 of sharecropping was part of a far larger process which saw peasants fall
 into debt and then lose their land to nobles, royal officers, city dwellers
 (bourgeois), and other privileged persons. This enormous transfer of
 property-Bloch termed it "the most decisive event of French social
 history"-stripped many a peasant of his property and reduced him to
 the status of a poor "sharecropper, often working what had once been
 his own land, which had been sold to some noble or rich bourgeois."1
 Because of its links with the wholesale loss of peasant land, most
 French historians associate sharecropping with rural poverty and in-
 creasing social stratification in the countryside. They also blame it for
 the stagnation of the French rural economy. Cut off from cash markets
 and lacking any capital, the French sharecropper (so the argument goes)
 would simply not improve the land he worked. His landlord was equally
 unlikely to do so, either because such investments returned him too
 little or because he seemed less interested in commercial agriculture
 than in consuming the produce from his land and in relishing the status
 Journal of Economic History, Vol. XLIV, No. 2 (June 1984). ? The Economic History
 Association. All rights reserved. ISSN 0022-0507.
 The author is Assistant Professor of History at the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena,
 California 91125.
 ' Marc Bloch, French Rural History, trans. Janet Sondheimer (Berkeley, 1970), pp. 125, 146-48;
 George Duby et al., Histoire de la France rurale, vol. 2: L'dge classique (Paris, 1975), pp. 230-31,
 264. Perhaps the best local study of sharecropping in France is Louis Merle's La me'tairie et
 l'9volution agraire de la Gdtine poitevine de lafin du Moyen Age a la Revolution (Paris, 1958). In
 the area Merle studied, share contracts rose from less than the 5 percent of the agricultural
 contracts in the 1580s to over 90 percent one century later.
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 310 Hoffman
 that ownership of property conferred. In addition, the draconian terms
 of most sharecropping contracts appeared to stifle any initiative. They
 dictated in great detail what a sharecropper was to do and thus, it is
 claimed, strangled individual initiative by tenants.2
 This picture of sharecropping and of its consequences leaves some-
 thing to be desired. That sharecropping grew more common in the
 sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and that its growth paralleled the
 increasing impoverishment of the French peasantry is undeniable. But it
 is not at all clear why anyone adopted sharecropping in the first place,
 nor why its spread was linked to the impoverishment of the peasantry.
 And, as we shall see, both contemporary attitudes and the modern
 theory of share contracts cast grave doubt upon the belief that share-
 cropping hindered economic growth in the countryside.
 Let us first consider how historians have explained the adoption of
 sharecropping. For Marc Bloch, sharecropping suited poorer tenants,
 who lacked capital. It was also "preferred by landlords of the petty
 bourgeois type." Such owners (so Bloch argued) favored sharecropping
 because their estates were too meager to attract cash-paying tenants and
 because share leases provided produce for the cellar and deference for
 the ego.3 Bloch's explanation, though, does not fit the facts. According
 to the most thorough local investigation of sharecropping-Louis
 Merle's study of the Gatine poitevine-it was not the petty bourgeoisie
 but the nobility who first leased farms on shares, and evidence from
 another region, the Lyonnais, also runs counter to Bloch.i There, petty
 bourgeois landlords showed no sign of preferring share contracts, and
 while poorer tenants might have displayed an inclination toward crop-
 ping, the difference was so small that it could easily have been the result
 of chance (Table 1).5
 The factors that early modern historians usually invoke to make sense
 of agricultural change-inflation, population pressure, and seignorial
 dues-also fail to account for the spread of sharecropping. Sharecrop-
 ping flourished both during the inflation of the sixteenth century and
 2 Bloch, History, pp. 147-48; Duby et al., Histoire, vol. 2, pp. 123, 130-31, 230-31; Robert
 Forster, "Obstacles to Agricultural Growth in Eighteenth-Century France," American Historical
 Review, 75, pt. 2 (1970), 1604-5; Merle, La me6tairie, p. 203. The question of agricultural tenure-in
 particular, the failure to develop wage labor-also figures prominently in the "Brenner debate"
 that has enlivened the pages of Past and Present. For this, see The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class
 Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe, ed. T. H. Ashton and C. H. E.
 Philpin (Cambridge, forthcoming).
 3 Bloch, History, pp. 146, 148.
 4 Merle, La metairie, p. 202.
 5 Admittedly, we have a small sample here, but the evidence is still unlikely to be a statistical
 fluke. One might worry about what would happen if the sample underrepresented one of the types
 of contracts-say labor contracts, which did not occur as frequently as tenancy contracts in the
 notarial registers. Fortunately we can put this worry to rest. Even if labor contracts were
 underrepresented in the sample, it would not disturb our logit coefficients (other than the constant),
 and hence it would not affect our conclusions.
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 TABLE 1
 LOGIT ANALYSIS OF SHARE AND NONSHARE CONTRACTS
 Variable Coefficient t-statistic
 Constant -0.786 -1.40
 PB (I for Petty-Bourgeois Landlords, -0.015 -1.68
 zero otherwise)
 POOR (1 for Poorer Tenants, zero 0.753 1.26
 otherwise)
 N 83 cases
 Likelihood ratio statistic 11.51 (3 degrees of freedom)
 Note: Petty bourgeois landlords include artisans, merchants (except for marchands bourgeois),
 notaries, and minor officers. Poorer tenants include laboureurs and those for whom no
 occupation was given. The dependent variable y is 1 for share contracts and zero otherwise.
 The logit model assumes that y depends on an unobserved variable y* = a0 + a, PB +
 a2 POOR + u, where the ai are unknown coefficients, u has a logistic distribution, y = 1 if y*
 > 0, and y = 0 otherwise. We estimate the ai by maximum likelihood methods (they are
 given with t-statistics in the table), and we can use them much as we use regression
 coefficients. For example, a positive a, would imply that petty bourgeois landlords were
 more likely to lease land on shares (as Bloch maintains), while a negative a, would imply the
 reverse. The same would hold for a2. But since our a, turns out to have a sign different from
 what Bloch suggested and since our a2 turns out not to be significantly different from zero,
 the evidence belies Bloch's argument.
 Source: Sample of 83 rental, share, and labor contracts from Archives departmentales du Rh6ne, 3
 E 1028-30, 1058, 2208-09, 2192, 8721-23, 8731-32, 8740, 8779. The records involved were
 all notarial records from a tiny area south of Lyon, near the towns of Saint-Genis-Laval,
 Taluyers, and Givors. The contracts date from the period 1563-1633, when the growth of
 sharecropping was at its height.
 during the declining prices of the 1600s. It spread in times of population
 growth and of population decline, and despite overall similarities in
 European population trends, sharecropping took root only in particular
 areas, such as parts of Italy and France. Finally, at least in France, the
 rise of sharecropping did not coincide with any major shift in seignorial
 dues or seignorial authority: the great dislocations in seignorial power
 occurred either in the later Middle Ages, well before sharecropping
 prevailed, or in the eighteenth century, well after it was firmly estab-
 lished.6
 A much more successful explanation of sharecropping emerges from
 a consideration of the problems landlords faced. Perhaps the best
 contemporary discussion of these difficulties appears in Olivier de
 Serres's Thedtre de agriculture, the classic treatise of 1600 on French
 farming. For de Serres, the hardships that property owners encountered
 were legion. Chief among them was the task of managing and of
 overseeing farms, a matter to which de Serres devoted an entire chapter
 of his book. Ideally, de Serres argued, a landlord would work his own
 6 On the crisis of French seigniors, see Robert Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure and
 Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe: The Agrarian Roots of European Capitalism,"
 Past and Present, 97 (Nov. 1982), pp. 58-65, 76-83.
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 land, hiring laborers and personally supervising their efforts. The
 drawback, though, was that farms and agricultural laborers required
 constant attention on the part of the owner. Only his supervision could
 "make the lazy diligent" and counter "the evil tendency of most hired
 hands, which in the absence of the master leads them merely to feign
 any effort." But the master's presence would cost him dearly if his
 property lay far from his home or if he had other affairs where he
 "earned much more than in the cultivation of the soil."'
 For absentee landlords of this sort, renting was the obvious alterna-
 tive, either for fixed rent or for shares. But even renting entailed certain
 complications. It was hard to find a reliable tenant who, while paying a
 fixed rent, would remain solvent, shoulder all the work, and absorb "at
 his own loss or profit" all the risks of the farm year. Such a tenant
 would pay less rent in return for taking on all the risk, and he would
 demand an even greater reduction if he furnished all the seed, livestock,
 and other farm inputs.8 Given the difficulties of finding dependable
 tenants, de Serres recommended sharecropping for most absentee
 landlords. It would be easier to find a trustworthy share tenant, for he
 did not "risk everything in advance," and he was less likely to go
 bankrupt. Whatever the form of the lease, though, the landlord would
 still have to watch over the tenant. Even a fixed-rent tenant might
 neglect buildings and fences or ignore problems with ditches that might
 cause flooding or erosion long after his lease had run out. He might cut
 vines too short, which could boost the yield during his tenure but reduce
 productivity thereafter. And at the end of his tenure, he might return the
 land "tired and exhausted, like rental horses."9
 One might dismiss de Serres as overly progressive and therefore
 unrepresentative of the majority of French landlords, but contracts in
 notarial registers testify to the same concerns. Labor contracts (such as
 the one concluded in 1598 between the notary Estienne Moyne of Saint-
 Genis-Laval and two partners, on the one hand, and Pierre Dupyn and
 Nicolas Charpin of Saint-Genis, on the other) always specified the tasks
 the laborers were to perform. Dupyn and Charpin, for example, were
 told in great detail what they were to do in a local vineyard that Moyne
 and his partners managed, and they were paid in stages as the work
 progressed in order to keep them from shirking. Share contracts did
 much the same, since croppers also had reason to undersupply labor. As
 for rental contracts, they commonly obliged tenants to pledge other
 7 Olivier de Serres, Le thgdtre de agriculture (Paris, 1600), pp. 45, 47-50; Bloch, History, p.
 144.
 8 De Serres, Le thedtre, pp. 46-48, 53. For more contemporary evidence from Normandy on this
 point and on the costs of administering estates in general, see Jonathon Dewald, The Formation of
 a Provincial Nobility (Princeton, 1980), pp. 195-200.
 9 De Serres, Le the6dtre, pp. 46-47, 53; Philip T. Hoffman, "Sharecropping and Investment in
 Agriculture in Early Modern France," this JOURNAL, 42 (March 1982), 155-59.
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 property as security against default. And whatever the contract, all farm
 owners tried to prohibit the misuse of property by tenants who might
 squander resources while avoiding the costs. It was not unusual to see
 prohibitions against the neglect of ditches and buildings, against the
 overworking of vines, excessive grazing or logging, and, in general,
 against the failure to return the property in good shape at the end of the
 lease. 1O
 In a frictionless, one-period world of no risks and perfect information,
 such problems never arise. But in the real world, these problems do
 bedevil landlords, and under the heading of transaction costs, they form
 part of the modern theory of agricultural contracts, a subject that has
 attracted the attention of a number of economic theorists and economic
 historians. Although this theory of contracts is far from complete, it
 does at least provide an explanation for the coexistence of rental, share,
 and wage-labor contracts in agriculture, and it also accounts for
 variations in the contractual mix.1' In a nutshell, the theory is based
 upon a trade-off between the transaction costs associated with a given
 contract and the risk premium needed to get parties to enter that
 contract. The transaction costs, which fall upon landlords, include the
 10 Archives departmentales du Rh6ne (Lyon, France), 3 E 8731 (Nov. 5 and Dec. 3, 1598); 8732
 (Feb. 7 and April 30, 1599; Jan. 6, Sept. 14, and Nov. 25, 1600); 8779 (April 4 and 9, 1600); 1028, fol.
 133 (1576); 8721 (July 3, Dec. 4, and Dec. 17, 1570).
 " For what follows, see David M. G. Newbery, "Risk, Sharing, Sharecropping and Uncertain
 Labor Markets," Review of Economic Studies, 44 (Oct. 1977), 585-94; Joseph Stiglitz, "Incentives
 and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," Review of Economic Studies, 41 (April 1974), 219-55; David
 M. G. Newbery and Joseph Stiglitz, "Sharecropping, Risk Sharing and the Importance of
 Imperfect Information," in Risk, Uncertainty, and Agricultural Development, ed. James A.
 Roumasset and Jean-Marc Boussard (College Laguna, 1979), pp. 311-39; Peter G. Warr, "Share
 Contracts, Limited Information and Production Uncertainty," Australian Economic Papers, 17
 (June 1978), 110-23; Robert E. B. Lucas, "Sharing, Monitoring, and Incentives: Marshallian
 Misallocation Reassessed," Journal of Political Economy, 87 (June 1979), 501-21; Robert Higgs,
 "Race, Tenure, and Resource Allocation in Southern Agriculture, 1910," this JOURNAL, 33 (March
 1973), 149-69; Lee J. Alston, "Tenure Choice in Southern Agriculture," Explorations in Economic
 History, 18 (July 1981), 211-32; Lee J. Alston and Robert Higgs, "Contractural Mix in Southern
 Agriculture Since the Civil War: Facts, Hypotheses, and Tests," this JOURNAL, 42 (June 1982),
 327-53. For additional work by economic theorists and economic historians on sharecropping, see
 Hoffman, "Sharecropping and Investment," pp. 155-56. There are of course a number of problems
 with this literature. To begin with, apart from several qualitative remarks, Newbery and Stiglitz
 deal with a world where the costs of monitoring labor are either zero or infinite-clearly unrealistic.
 If these monitoring costs are zero, they go on to show that sharecropping offers no risk-sharing
 advantages, provided there are no economies of scale and no uncertainty in factor markets; see
 Hoffman, "Sharecropping and Investment," pp. 155-56, for details. More realistic theory can be
 found in Warr and Lucas, who deal with sharecropping versus renting and sharecropping versus
 labor; both these articles include specifics of the effect of monitoring and transaction costs upon
 contractual choice. As for Higgs and Alston, they have the virtue of using a simple model involving
 a trade-off between transaction costs and the risk premium needed to attract tenants. Their work
 has been most useful, but they assume (as do I) that landlords enter into contracts after they have
 made decisions about what to farm. For the problems of such an assumption, see Alston, "Tenure
 is Southern Agriculture," p. 219. What we need is a general equilibrium model that explicitly
 includes transaction costs and explains the mix of all three types of contracts. Such a theory does
 not yet exist.
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.115 on Thu, 17 Mar 2016 23:47:37 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 314 Hoffman
 costs of enforcing the contract and of insuring that the tenant or the
 hired hand meets his part of the bargain. The landlord's transaction
 costs are highest for labor contracts, for in addition to keeping the
 laborer from misusing the property, the landlord has to supervise him to
 make sure he furnishes the amount of labor specified in the contract.
 With perfect information and no uncertainty, a landlord could observe
 the hired hand's effort directly or infer it from agricultural output. But in
 the real world, he has to pay to discover how hard the laborer works,
 and he has to monitor him in order to prevent shirking. The transaction
 costs are somewhat lower for sharecropping, because the cropper has
 some incentive to work; however, the landlord must still supervise the
 cropper to a certain extent, because the cropper receives only a fraction
 of his marginal product and hence has reason to undersupply labor.
 Transaction costs are lowest of all for fixed-rent contracts, for the
 renter receives his full marginal product and therefore has no reason to
 shirk. The landlord need only insure that the tenant does not ruin the
 property. 12
 What keeps landlords from offering nothing but fixed rental contracts
 with their low transaction costs is the premium (in the form of reduced
 rent, for example), which they must offer risk-averse tenants in order to
 induce them to accept the uncertainties of paying a fixed rent. The
 premium is lower for share contracts because croppers absorb only a
 fraction of the risk. And since there is little or no risk attached to a fixed
 wage payment, the landlord need offer no premium in order to engage
 farmhands. The mix of contracts is then determined by the balance
 between transaction costs and risk premiums.
 If transaction costs increase (other things being equal) then we would
 expect landlords to shift from wage contracts toward sharecropping and
 renting. Rental contracts would also become preferable to share agree-
 ments. In each case, more landlords would prefer to pay risk premiums
 to tenants rather than to face the higher transaction costs, and the
 resultant change in the supply of contracts would shift the contractual
 mix. And of course the reverse would be true if transaction costs
 dropped.
 One virtue of this theory is that it clearly fits the qualitative evidence
 from early modern France. De Serres and other contemporaries noticed
 that renters demanded a premium in the form of lower rent for the risks
 12 This account of contract choice is only one among several possible theories; there are other
 explanations that place greater stress upon the landlord's entrepreneurial input, other factors of
 production, and incentives. See, for example, William Hallaghan, "Self Selection by Contractural
 Choice and the Theory of Sharecropping," Bell Journal of Economics, 9 (Autumn 1978), 344-54;
 and Joseph D. Reid, "Sharecropping and Agricultural Uncertainty," Economic Development and
 Cultural Change, 24 (April 1976), 549-76. These alternative theories, though, have their own
 limitations-Reid, for example, tends to glide over questions of monitoring costs-and they do not
 fit the early modern qualitative evidence as well as the explanation I have given. In any case, all of
 these different theories are in fact more complementary than mutually exclusive.
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 they faced, and de Serres suggested that the premium and the risks were
 reduced for sharecroppers. De Serres and the contracts themselves also
 make it clear that landlords had to do more and more monitoring as they
 moved from renting toward sharecropping and wage labor. Indeed,
 rental contracts invariably contained fewer stipulations than either
 share or wage labor contracts.
 Furthermore, the theory actually yields a hypothesis applicable to
 early modem quantitative data: if transaction costs rise, a given
 landlord will be more likely to prefer rental contracts to sharecropping,
 and sharecropping to wage labor, all other things being equal. We can
 then test this hypothesis with the Lyonnais contracts that we used to
 examine Bloch's ideas. The transaction costs themselves are unobserv-
 able, but the contracts do furnish two useful proxies for the costs of
 supervising a farm and of monitoring labor. The first is the distance
 between the landlord's residence and the location of his property. De
 Serres and other contemporaries noted that distant property was more
 expensive to administer, and for this reason de Serres all but ruled out
 wage labor for most absentee landlords.'3 Obviously, transaction costs
 would rise the farther away the property.
 The second proxy affecting transaction costs is the presence or
 absence of vineyards. Vines were a capital investment requiring consid-
 erable supervision whatever the contract-recall, for example, de
 Serres's warning against tenants who cut them too short. Once the
 landlord took steps to inspect the vines, though, the marginal cost of
 monitoring his sharecropper's or his hired hand's labor was reduced. On
 farms with vines, then, we would expect lower costs for monitoring
 labor, more sharecropping relative to renting, and more wage labor
 relative to any form of tenancy. 14
 The evidence from the sample of Lyonnais contracts supports both
 these contentions. In the tiny region from which these contracts were
 drawn, risks probably did not vary greatly; hence we can in effect hold
 constant the other major factor-risk conditions-which affected the
 contractual mix.'" Transaction costs should then explain the variations
 in contract type, and if we apply logit analysis, we find that our proxies
 for the transaction costs do indeed have the expected effect on contract
 choice (Table 2). The positive sign of the distance variable coefficients
 implies that landlords were more likely to lease distant property to
 renters and sharecroppers than to hire wage labor. Distant estates were
 also more likely to be leased for a fixed rent than sharecropped.
 Similarly, the negative coefficients for vines suggest that vineyard
 owners were more likely (other things being equal) to hire laborers than
 '3 De Serres, Le theadtre, pp. 46-48, 53. See also Dewald, Formation of a Provincial Nobility, pp.
 183-201.
 14 Compare the similar argument of Alston and Higgs, "Contractual Mix," p. 340.
 s Compare ibid., p. 344.
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 TABLE 2
 LOGIT ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT CHOICE
 Coefficient for
 Effect on
 Coefficient for Effect on Sharecropping
 Renting Relative to Wage Relative to
 Variable Labor Wage Labor
 Constant 1.932 1.869
 VINE (I for Property with -4.45 -3.25
 Vineyards, zero otherwise)
 t-statistic -3.15 -2.38
 DISTANCE (Kilometers from 0.076 0.060
 Landlord's Home to
 Property)
 t-statistic 2.07 1.65
 N 83 cases
 Log-likelihood ratio 58.47 (6 degrees of freedom)
 Note: The logit analysis seeks to explain the choice of rental, share, or labor contracts by means of
 the two independent variables: VINE and DISTANCE. As in the simple case of binomial
 logit, we assume that choice of contract is dictated by unobserved latent variables that are
 linear functions of VINE and DISTANCE. If PI, P2, and P3 are the probabilities,
 respectively, of rental, share, and labor contracts, then it turns out that
 In - = a0 + a, VINE + a2 DISTANCE,
 P3
 where a0, a,, and a2 are the coefficients estimated in the left column above. Similarly,
 In p = bo + b1 VINE + b2 DISTANCE,
 P3
 where the bi are estimated in the right column above. Again, we can interpret the coefficients
 much as we do in regression: the positive coefficient of DISTANCE in the right column
 implies that the greater the distance, the more common sharecropping is relative to wage
 labor. Note that we can also estimate the relative odds of rental versus sharecropping; it
 follows from the relationships and estimates above that
 In P = 0.06 - 1.20 VINE + 0.016 DISTANCE
 P2 (1.94) (1.58)
 Here t-statistics are in parentheses. Note that vines make sharecropping preferable to
 renting, and distance does the reverse.
 Source: See Table 1.
 to engage tenants. They also found sharecropping preferable to renting,
 as expected. Furthermore, not only did all of these coefficients have the
 proper signs, but nearly all of them passed the appropriate one-tailed
 tests of significance at better than the 5 percent level.'6
 Obviously, a number of criticisms could be raised against this
 evidence. First, one could argue that instead of using the presence of
 vines as a proxy for lower labor-monitoring costs we should have
 included any landlord contribution of capital. Any capital good or
 equipment, from vines and oxen to hand tools, would cut the marginal
 16 One-tailed tests are appropriate since the theory predicted the signs of the various coefficients.
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 cost of supervising labor. This is certainly a reasonable argument, and
 the only justification for singling out vines is that they were mentioned
 by de Serres and that they represented the landlord's major capital
 contribution to local farming. They also undoubtedly required more
 supervision than other capital goods. In any event, substituting the
 presence of any landlord capital does not change the logit analysis
 significantly. All the coefficients still have the proper sign, and most are
 still significant.'7
 A second concern might be a number of additional variables that
 perhaps should be included in the analysis. Higher urban wages, for
 example, could conceivably make agricultural labor contracts harder to
 enforce, because a hired hand might abandon the plow to work in town.
 But if we insert a real wage index for urban workers into the logit
 analysis, it fails the significance test, no doubt because the labor market
 was strong enough to provide a replacement for any farm worker who
 quit his post.'8 A more troubling omission is the lack of any measure for
 the amount of land being farmed. A large farm might well involve
 increased labor supervision costs, and thus farm size might affect the
 choice of a contract. Unfortunately, the agricultural contracts from this
 period do not usually report the size of the plots in question, so no
 perfectly reliable land measure is available. But we can take refuge
 behind the fact that in those contracts that do mention land size the
 farms are relatively homogeneous. Moreover, we can use the number of
 plots mentioned in each contract as a crude measure of farm size; when
 added to the logit analysis, the number of plots fails significance tests
 and does not disturb the other coefficients.'9
 Finally, one might criticize the assumption that risk conditions
 remained constant. While agricultural risks might not have varied
 greatly over the tiny region from which the sample was selected, they
 could have changed over the period the contracts covered (the years
 1563-1633), and the fluctuations in risk might have affected the contract
 mix. One way to test this would be to employ the variations in local
 lease rates as an approximate measure of risk. When inserted into the
 logit analysis, though, this risk proxy proves insignificant, and it hardly
 " The presence of vines does seem to have a stronger effect on contract choice than do other
 sorts of landlord capital. The reason may be that the vineyards required more constant surveillance
 than tools or animals; moreover, damage to vines was more difficult to remedy since there was
 obviously no rental market one could turn to in order to replace damaged vines.
 18 If we add a real wage index for urban building workers to the logit equations with VINE and
 DISTANCE, the t-statistics are far from significant (t = 0.22 for the effect on renting; t = -0.05 for
 the effect on sharecropping). I have also tried to add various human capital measures, such as
 literacy and occupation, to the logit analysis, because some of the literature on contract choice
 suggests that the various contracts allow landlords to screen for tenant skill. Unfortunately, I found
 no evidence for this, no doubt because my human capital proxies were poor measures of the
 requisite skills.
 19 With a larger sample, we could verify that the number of plots was an accurate proxy by
 checking it for those contracts that do mention farm size. I plan to do this in future research.
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 affects the other logit coefficients.20 Evidently, risk conditions did not
 vary enough to shift contract choices.
 To be sure, a sample of 83 cases may seem like very little evidence to
 hinge a theory upon, but the t-statistics belie the insinuation that the
 results are the work of chance. More evidence and more analysis are
 certainly in order before we can be certain (one would like to know, for
 example, what risks peasants faced as consumers, what other forms of
 insurance were available to them, and what bigger landlords did), but at
 the very least the theory of agricultural contracts gives us an attractive
 candidate for future research.2' And as we have seen, the theory has the
 added virtue of explaining the qualitative evidence, drawn from de
 Serres and other sources in several regions of early modern France.
 The theory also provides a ready explanation for the spread of
 sharecropping. Sharecropping, we saw, grew more prevalent at precise-
 ly the same time that French peasants were losing their land to absentee
 landlords. These absentee owners had to contend with costs of adminis-
 tering distant, newly purchased properties, and from what we know of
 the theory of contracts, it was only natural that they resorted to
 sharecropping (and to renting) instead of hiring laborers.22 The increase
 in sharecropping (relative to wage labor) was thus a result of the transfer
 of peasant property into the hands of absentee landlords, and this
 transfer itself appears to have been caused by the monarchy's fiscal
 system, for the monarchy was granting increasingly valuable tax
 exemptions to precisely the sort of privileged person who bought up the
 peasant land. These nobles, officers, and city dwellers paid little or
 nothing in the way of taxes on the peasant land they purchased, and
 they bought up land from tax-paying peasant proprietors until the costs
 of administering distant property outweighed the value of their tax
 exemptions.23 As absentee owners, they simply found sharecropping
 preferable to wage labor.
 It is clear as well why sharecropping was so often associated with
 poverty: it was, quite simply, a way of administering property in areas
 20 I relied upon an index of lease rates for a fixed collection of farm plots to construct my risk
 proxy. If the lease rates included a risk premium, then the level of the index itself ought to provide a
 rough proxy of risk conditions. If, on the other hand, the lease rates reflected only the expected
 profits from farming, then the coefficient of variation of the lease rates ought to track risk. I tried
 both proxies for risk, with similar results.
 21 One additional task for future research is to specify a theoretical model in such a way that
 under certain circumstances sharecropping could actually become preferable to both wage labor
 and renting. This would be possible, for example, with a probit model.
 22 A numerical example would be useful here. On the basis of our logit coefficients, we would
 expect a landlord who lived adjacent to his vineyard to sharecrop only 19 percent of the time and
 employ wage labor 75 percent of the time. An absentee landlord who lived 20 kilometers from the
 vineyard (a typical figure in the Lyonnais) would be much more likely to sharecrop (38 percent of
 the time) and less likely to farm with laborers (45 percent of the time).
 23 For this, see "Social History and Taxes: The Case of Early Modern France," California
 Institute of Technology Social Science Working Paper 495 (1983).
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 where overburdened peasants had lost their farms to absentee owners, a
 contract undertaken with tenants who possessed little or no land or
 capital. But if sharecropping was associated with rural poverty, it is
 wrong to blame it for France's agricultural stagnation. The frequent
 claim that sharecropping meant disengagement from the market col-
 lapses once we realize that highly commercial crops were often raised
 by croppers: not just wine in the Lyonnais, but also mulberry trees for
 the silk trade farther south. Indeed, share landlords were frequently
 involved in the sale, rather than in the consumption, of the produce
 from these estates.24 Nor does it seem proper to argue that the
 draconian clauses in sharecropping leases stifled agricultural change.
 These clauses, we have seen, were merely rational attempts to protect
 property rights and monitor labor. They were supple enough to change
 from place to place and over time, and regular labor contracts contained
 even more rigid clauses.25 Indeed, economic theory suggests that
 sharecropping was merely a way of dealing with risk, incentives, and
 transaction costs. It was thus not an obstacle to economic growth, and
 the true causes of agriculture stagnation in France have to be sought
 elsewhere-perhaps in the tax system that treated peasants so unfairly.
 24 Duby et al., Histoire, vol. 2, p. 235; Serge Dontenwill, "Les baux a mi-fruits en Roannais et
 Brionnais aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siecles," in Jean-Pierre Gutton, Lyon et I'Europe: Hommes et
 Socigtgs: Melanges d'histoire offerts d Richard Gascon, 2 vols. (Lyon, 1980), vol. 2, p. 198.
 25 Although Louis Merle talks of the "draconian" terms of the sharecropping contracts, he
 acknowledges that they changed; see Merle, La metairie, pp. 161-85, 203, and also de Serres, Le
 thgdtre, pp. 51-52.
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